City of Rivals: Restoring the Glorious Mess of American Democracy

Name: City of Rivals: Restoring the Glorious Mess of American Democracy
Author: Jason Grumet

by Jason Grumet

Genre

Nonfiction

Year

2014

Pages

293

Contents

Overview

City of Rivals: Restoring the Glorious Mess of American Democracy is Jason Grumet’s argument that American democracy is not failing because conflict exists, but because the habits that once made conflict productive have withered. Drawing on his work in energy policy and as founder of the Bipartisan Policy Center, Grumet presents bipartisanship not as bland moderation, but as a practical method for governing a divided country.

The book centers on Congress, the Senate, elections, ethics rules, transparency reforms, and the culture of Washington. Grumet contends that media, money, gerrymandering, and ideological sorting matter, but that the deeper problem is the erosion of trust, personal relationships, private deliberation, strong committees, and incentives that attract capable people to public service.

Through examples from the Founding era, Watergate reforms, Senate filibusters, Y2K planning, campaign finance, earmarks, and nomination battles, Grumet asks how a messy republic can recover its ability to solve problems. His central theme is that democracy needs rivals, but it also needs institutions and relationships strong enough to let rivals govern together.

Plot Summary ⚠️ Spoilers

Jason Grumet begins City of Rivals with a paradox: American government is more transparent and publicly scrutinized than ever, yet it seems less able to solve urgent problems. He treats public anger at Washington as legitimate, rooted in economic insecurity, weak public confidence, and failed governance, but argues that contempt alone cannot repair democracy. His own answer comes from two decades of policy negotiation, especially in energy and climate debates, where he learned that divided interests can reach serious agreements if they have trust, evidence, and space to deliberate.

The introduction grounds that claim in the founding of the Bipartisan Policy Center in 2007 by former Senate leaders Howard Baker, Bob Dole, Tom Daschle, and George Mitchell. These men had fought hard partisan battles, yet they retained affection, respect, and confidence in the legislative process. Grumet contrasts their habits with a newer Washington in which opponents rarely know one another and major laws often pass through party-line discipline. He argues that the goal is not nonpartisanship, but functional partisanship: proud Democrats and Republicans negotiating from their own principles while accepting that opponents may also be patriotic.

Grumet then traces the need for collaboration to the Constitution. The Founding Generation designed a system that would resist pure majority passion, force negotiation among branches and factions, and balance local demands against national needs. The Bill of Rights itself emerged from compromise between Federalists and Anti-Federalists. Grumet’s examples of political courage, from George Washington and Thomas Jefferson to Daniel Webster and Ronald Reagan, emphasize leaders who accepted risk or compromise in order to preserve broader public purposes. But Vietnam, Watergate, and the reforms that followed changed the nation’s attitude toward government. Watchdog journalism and reform organizations exposed real abuses, yet they also helped make suspicion of government a permanent norm.

From there, Grumet examines the usual explanations for dysfunction: media, money, and gerrymandering. He acknowledges that each worsens polarization. Modern media rewards outrage, campaign money has exploded, and manipulated districts reduce electoral competition. Yet he argues that none fully explains the collapse, because partisan media, political money, and safe districts have existed in earlier eras when Congress still governed. The better question is why Washington’s institutional house can no longer withstand these storms. His answer is cultural erosion: lawmakers have lost the relationships, familiarity, and private trust that once allowed them to weigh national interests against partisan and local pressures.

The Senate filibuster becomes Grumet’s first major institutional case study. He contrasts the heroic fictional filibuster of Jefferson Smith with the modern routine filibuster, which is often painless, procedural, and invisible. The history of extended debate, cloture, civil rights obstruction, the 1964 Civil Rights Act, amendment-tree tactics, and the 2013 nuclear option shows that rules matter, but Grumet insists behavior matters more. Earlier senators could fight fiercely while still honoring commitments, as Russell Long did for Pete Domenici despite opposing Domenici’s amendment. Grumet favors reforms that restore open amendment debate, accountability, and negotiation rather than simply abolishing minority rights.

He next shows how relationships once helped Washington solve unglamorous problems. During the impeachment-era rancor of the 1990s, Bob Bennett and Chris Dodd led a bipartisan Y2K committee that quietly pushed government and industry to prepare for the computer-date problem. Their success contrasts with the later collapse of a cybersecurity bill led by Joe Lieberman and Susan Collins. Grumet argues that earlier Washington had restaurants, families, travel, staff networks, and informal routines that built familiarity. The commuter Congress, compressed workweeks, members sleeping in offices, fundraising, and anti-Washington campaigning turned Congress into a body of strangers. Rare successes such as the Ryan-Murray budget deal show that personal rapport still matters.

Grumet then challenges the assumption that more transparency always improves democracy. George Mitchell’s private Northern Ireland negotiations illustrate how secrecy from the press and factions can allow negotiators to test concessions without public punishment. Grumet distinguishes corrupt secrecy from necessary privacy. The Constitutional Convention, major legislative bargains, and Senate leadership relationships all depended on protected deliberation. By contrast, C-SPAN, FOIA, open-meeting rules, digital records, and post-Watergate disclosure norms can push officials into performance, discourage candid writing, and force real discussion into informal channels. His proposed balance preserves public accountability for decisions while protecting early-stage policy conversations.

The book’s institutional critique continues with congressional committees. Grumet argues that committees can be laboratories of democracy because small groups develop expertise and trust. After the 1946 reorganization, committees became productive engines of legislation, but entrenched chairs also abused their power, especially in blocking civil rights. Later reforms weakened chairs, yet power flowed to party leaders rather than rank-and-file lawmakers. Fragmented jurisdictions and overlapping subcommittees left Congress unable to handle complex issues such as cybersecurity, derivatives, homeland security, energy, and climate policy. Grumet proposes stronger standing committees, temporary ad hoc committees for cross-cutting problems, incentives for serious attendance, and clearer routes for committee bills to reach the floor.

Grumet then argues that anti-corruption reforms often create immaculate dysfunction. Jack Abramoff’s crimes justified public outrage, but broad gift bans, meal restrictions, travel stigma, campaign finance limits, and the elimination of earmarks often burden ordinary law-abiding officials more than criminals. McCain-Feingold weakened parties while money moved to Super PACs and dark-money groups. Ethics rules chilled normal meals and policy gatherings. Travel restrictions reduced knowledge and collegiality. The earmark ban removed a transparent bargaining tool that could connect local needs to national compromise. Grumet does not defend corruption; he argues for punishing abuse while preserving accountable tools of negotiation.

Finally, Grumet turns to the people democracy attracts. Low turnout, mistrust of elections, closed or low-participation primaries, partisan election administration, constant fundraising, intrusive vetting, Senate confirmation delays, and anti-lobbyist rules all shrink the pool of capable public servants. He recommends modern voter registration, broader participation, early or weekend voting, more open primaries, fewer Senate-confirmed positions, streamlined nominations, sensible treatment of lobbyist expertise, limits on leadership PACs, immediate disclosure, and small-donor support. The conclusion returns to the contrast between bipartisan respect for Howard Baker and Bob Dole and the contemporary Senate’s fatalism. Grumet rejects the claim that paralysis is simply what the Founders intended. He calls instead for a repaired City of Rivals: a democracy still argumentative and partisan, but connected enough, private enough, ethical enough, and institutionally capable enough to govern.

Characters

Jason Grumet

The author and narrator of the book, he diagnoses Washington’s dysfunction through his experience in energy policy, negotiation, and the founding of the Bipartisan Policy Center. His role is to argue that democratic repair depends on rebuilding trust, relationships, institutions, and practical bipartisan habits.
Bipartisan Policy Center

The organization Grumet founded in 2007 to convene opposing viewpoints, use rigorous analysis, and advocate for agreed policy recommendations. It serves as the book’s central example of structured bipartisan problem-solving.
Howard Baker

A former Senate leader and Bipartisan Policy Center founder who represents principled, courageous, bipartisan leadership. Grumet uses his career and later tributes to show what functional rivalry once looked like in the Senate.
Bob Dole

A former Senate leader and Bipartisan Policy Center founder whose respect for opponents and humor embody the personal relationships Grumet believes Washington has lost. He is repeatedly used as an example of hard partisanship joined to institutional loyalty.
Tom Daschle

A former Senate Democratic leader and Bipartisan Policy Center founder who helps illustrate Grumet’s model of partisan rivalry combined with trust. His cooperation with Trent Lott and criticism of the modern filibuster support the book’s argument about lost Senate norms.
George Mitchell

A former Senate leader and Bipartisan Policy Center founder whose Northern Ireland negotiations demonstrate the value of private deliberation. He also appears as an example of how fundraising and modern schedules crowd out legislative work.
American public

Citizens whose frustration, mistrust, economic anxiety, and low participation frame the book’s stakes. Grumet argues that public anger is justified but must be directed toward institutional repair rather than cynicism.
Congress

The central institution in Grumet’s diagnosis, portrayed as weakened by distrust, compressed schedules, fundraising, procedural warfare, and diminished committees. The book’s reforms are largely aimed at restoring Congress’s capacity to deliberate and legislate.
The Senate

The chamber most associated with extended debate, confirmations, personal relationships, and procedural breakdown. Grumet uses the filibuster, holds, nominations, and Senate culture to show how rules depend on trust.
The Founding Generation

The constitutional designers whose system of separated powers, factional conflict, and compromise frames Grumet’s argument. They are presented as creating a republic that requires collaboration rather than pure majority rule.
Federalists

Supporters of the Constitution who defended stronger national authority and institutions capable of resisting temporary passions. They help Grumet explain why American democracy was built for constructive conflict.
Anti-Federalists

Critics of the Constitution who feared concentrated federal power and loss of local accountability. Their objections helped produce the Bill of Rights and illustrate compromise at the nation’s founding.
James Madison

A Federalist thinker used to explain faction, public passion, and the constitutional need for institutions that refine popular will. He anchors Grumet’s discussion of republican design.
Alexander Hamilton

A Federalist advocate cited for defending stronger national authority and rejecting pure democracy. He appears in the book’s account of constitutional conflict and collaboration.
George Washington

Presented as an example of political courage for suppressing the Whiskey Rebellion to preserve the union. His role supports Grumet’s argument that leadership sometimes requires defending unpopular decisions.
Thomas Jefferson

Used as an example of a leader who acted despite constitutional doubts and public objections in pursuing the Louisiana Purchase. He illustrates Grumet’s older model of political courage.
Daniel Webster

Profiled for supporting the Compromise of 1850 despite political costs. Grumet uses him to show the danger and necessity of compromise in preserving national unity.
Ronald Reagan

Cited as a confident partisan who could still compromise, especially in the Social Security negotiations with Tip O’Neill. He helps Grumet distinguish collaboration from ideological emptiness.
Tip O’Neill

A House Speaker who appears both as Reagan’s negotiating counterpart and as a defender of congressional norms against televised attacks. He represents a style of partisan leadership rooted in institutional respect.
Richard Nixon

His Watergate scandal marks a major turning point in the rise of distrust and post-scandal reform. Grumet treats Watergate as both a necessary exposure of abuse and a source of lasting suspicion.
John Gardner

The founder of Common Cause, he represents reformers who sought to expose special interests and increase public oversight after Vietnam and Watergate. Grumet uses his legacy to examine the unintended consequences of reform.
Media

A recurring force blamed for polarization because it rewards outrage, speed, and ideological enforcement. Grumet acknowledges its influence but argues it does not fully explain modern dysfunction.
Money in politics

A recurring source of public suspicion and campaign pressure throughout the book. Grumet argues that money cannot be eliminated and should instead be channeled toward transparent, accountable institutions.
Gerrymandering

An electoral practice Grumet treats as harmful but insufficient as a complete explanation for gridlock. It helps frame his broader claim that structural reforms alone cannot restore political culture.
Newt Gingrich

A Republican leader used to illustrate televised confrontation, anti-Washington campaigning, and the shift toward stronger party leadership. His role shows how political incentives changed members’ relationships to Washington and one another.
Harry Reid

A Senate Democratic leader associated with the 2013 nuclear option and frequent use of amendment-tree tactics. In the conclusion, his comments also help frame the debate over whether dysfunction is constitutional design or institutional failure.
Mitch McConnell

A Senate Republican leader who appears in the conclusion arguing that the Senate was designed to be slow and painful. Grumet uses that view as a position to challenge, not as an excuse for paralysis.
Trent Lott

A former Senate Republican leader whose memories of relationships, procedural conflict, and earmarks help Grumet contrast older and newer Senate cultures. His cooperation with Tom Daschle models respectful partisan competition.
Pete Domenici

A Republican senator whose disputes and partnerships show the importance of trust in legislative work. His interactions with Russell Long and Jeff Bingaman illustrate both Senate norms and productive committee leadership.
Russell Long

A powerful Democratic chairman who honored his word to Pete Domenici despite opposing Domenici’s amendment. Grumet uses him to demonstrate how personal commitments once restrained procedural warfare.
Robert C. Byrd

A Democratic leader whose use of filling the amendment tree helped begin a procedural arms race in the Senate. His role supports Grumet’s argument that tactics become destructive when trust erodes.
Lamar Alexander

A Republican senator who worked with Chuck Schumer on experiments to restore more open Senate debate. He represents Grumet’s hope that senators can still revive regular legislative process.
Chuck Schumer

A Democratic senator who appears in efforts to restore open Senate debate and a more dynamic legislative process. His role shows that procedural reform can be bipartisan when members choose collaboration.
Bob Bennett

A Utah Republican senator who identified the Y2K threat and co-led the Senate’s preventive response. His work with Chris Dodd is one of Grumet’s clearest examples of quiet bipartisan success.
Chris Dodd

A Connecticut Democratic senator who partnered with Bob Bennett on Y2K preparation. Their committee work shows how trust and expertise can solve serious problems even amid partisan conflict.
Bill Clinton

President during the turbulent 1990s, including shutdowns, investigations, and impeachment. Grumet uses his era to show that intense conflict did not always prevent serious negotiation.
Joe Lieberman

An independent Democrat who helped negotiate a cybersecurity bill that later collapsed procedurally. His failed effort with Susan Collins contrasts with the earlier Y2K success.
Susan Collins

A Maine Republican who worked with Joe Lieberman on bipartisan cybersecurity legislation. The bill’s failure demonstrates Grumet’s claim that trust and process had deteriorated.
Patty Murray

A Democratic senator whose personal rapport with Paul Ryan helped produce a 2013 budget agreement. She illustrates how trust can protect negotiators politically.
Paul Ryan

A Republican representative whose relationship with Patty Murray helped overcome budget negotiations. Grumet uses their agreement as a rare modern example of personal connection enabling compromise.
Barack Obama

President cited in discussions of limited social ties with congressional Republicans, transparency expectations, nomination conflict, vetting, and lobbyist restrictions. His administration illustrates several modern barriers to governing.
Mervin Kelly

The Bell Labs executive used as an analogy for designing institutions around productive encounters. Grumet invokes him to explain why Congress needs spaces and routines that create collaboration.
Max Baucus

A Senate Finance leader who sought confidential tax reform ideas to overcome the chilling effects of transparency. His example supports Grumet’s argument for protected deliberation.
Orrin Hatch

A Senate Finance leader who joined Max Baucus in protecting confidential tax reform suggestions. He helps illustrate bipartisan recognition that some policy work requires privacy.
Dick Cheney

A former vice president cited for defending confidential executive deliberation. His role appears in Grumet’s discussion of the tension between transparency and effective governance.
Justice Louis Brandeis

The Supreme Court justice whose phrase laboratories of democracy frames Grumet’s discussion of congressional committees. Grumet adapts the idea to argue that committees can test and refine national policy.
Robert La Follette Jr.

A senator who co-led the 1940s effort to streamline and strengthen congressional committees. His work helps explain the rise of committees as productive legislative engines.
Mike Monroney

A representative who co-chaired the reorganization effort that led to the 1946 committee reforms. He appears in the book’s history of Congress’s institutional design.
Paul Kanjorski

A House subcommittee chairman who asked the Bipartisan Policy Center to help educate members during the financial crisis. His off-the-record dinners show how committees and outside conveners can support substantive learning.
Scott Garrett

A ranking Republican who supported bipartisan financial policy dinners with Paul Kanjorski. His role demonstrates the continuing possibility of cross-party policy education.
Jeff Bingaman

A Senate Energy Committee leader associated with bipartisan energy legislation and climate-related negotiations. He helps Grumet show the promise of serious committee work.
Lisa Murkowski

A ranking Republican who helped negotiate a bipartisan Senate Energy Committee bill that leadership later sidelined. Her example illustrates how leadership control can undercut committee collaboration.
Nancy Pelosi

House Speaker cited for bypassing John Dingell in the climate policy fight. Her role shows how leadership power can override committee authority.
John Dingell

An Energy and Commerce chairman whose authority was worked around during climate policy negotiations. He represents the tension between committee expertise and leadership strategy.
Jack Abramoff

A disgraced lobbyist whose crimes triggered major ethics and lobbying reforms. Grumet uses the scandal to argue that reactions to corruption can overcorrect and weaken normal democratic interaction.
John McCain

Co-sponsor of McCain-Feingold, the campaign finance law Grumet critiques for weakening parties while money moved elsewhere. He is central to the book’s campaign finance discussion.
Russ Feingold

Co-sponsor of McCain-Feingold and a key figure in the soft-money reform debate. His role helps Grumet explain how well-intended campaign finance reform produced unintended effects.
Super PACs

Independent spending groups portrayed as less accountable and often more negative than political parties. They illustrate Grumet’s claim that money moved into darker channels after reform.
Lyndon Johnson

A Democratic leader and president used in examples of national purpose and legislative bargaining. Grumet cites him in both the Sputnik response and the use of local projects to advance civil rights.
Charles Halleck

A House Republican leader who supported civil rights after securing Purdue funding. His example supports Grumet’s defense of transparent bargaining tools.
Andy Card

A Bush chief of staff who recalls dealmaking used to pass Medicare Part D. Grumet uses his account to show how legislative bargaining can advance major policy.
American voters

The electorate whose mistrust, low turnout, and primary participation shape the kind of leaders who reach office. Grumet argues that broadening and legitimizing participation is necessary to improve governance.
Presidential nominees

Qualified candidates deterred by intrusive vetting, paperwork, delays, debt, and public humiliation. They illustrate Grumet’s concern that government discourages capable people from serving.
Lobbyists

Advocates and experts whom Grumet says are often stigmatized too broadly. He argues that transparent lobbying can contribute knowledge and help bridge mistrust.
Norm Ornstein

A political scientist quoted on the link between low primary turnout, polarization, and legislative stagnation. His role supports Grumet’s election-reform argument.
Watergate Babies

The 1974 reform-era lawmakers whose reforms weakened entrenched chairs and reshaped Congress. Their departure in the conclusion marks a generational transition in debates over transparency and trust.

Themes

Jason Grumet’s City of Rivals is organized around a paradox: American democracy was designed to be argumentative, but not incapacitated. The book’s central theme is that conflict is not the enemy of self-government; the loss of habits that make conflict productive is. From the Constitutional Convention and the Federalist-Anti-Federalist divide to the friendships among Howard Baker, Bob Dole, Tom Daschle, and George Mitchell, Grumet presents democracy as a system that depends on rivals who can oppose one another without denying each other’s legitimacy.

Constructive rivalry and principled compromise. Grumet repeatedly distinguishes bipartisanship from bland consensus. His examples—Reagan and Tip O’Neill on Social Security, Bennett and Dodd on Y2K, Murray and Ryan on the budget—show that durable agreements emerge when strong partisans negotiate from conviction rather than surrendering it. The “City of Rivals” is not a city without disagreement; it is one where disagreement is disciplined by trust.
The erosion of political community. A recurring motif is the disappearance of informal Washington: dinners at the Monocle, congressional families living near one another, travel, shared committees, and chance encounters. Grumet contrasts the successful Y2K response with the failed cybersecurity bill to argue that technical problems become politically unsolvable when lawmakers no longer know or trust one another.
The double edge of reform. Chapters on transparency, ethics rules, campaign finance, and earmarks suggest that reforms born from Watergate, Vietnam, and Abramoff-era scandals often overcorrected. Sunlight can expose corruption, but constant visibility can also turn deliberation into performance. Gift bans, travel restrictions, and earmark prohibitions may reassure the public symbolically while stripping away tools that once enabled bargaining, learning, and coalition-building.
Institutions shape character. The book resists blaming dysfunction solely on bad leaders, media, money, or gerrymandering. Grumet instead examines how filibuster customs, weakened committees, compressed schedules, partisan primaries, and confirmation warfare reward suspicion and rigidity. His proposed repairs—stronger committees, protected deliberation, broader voter participation, and fewer barriers to public service—reflect his belief that better structures can cultivate better conduct.

Ultimately, City of Rivals is a defense of democratic messiness. Grumet does not ask Americans to love Washington as it is; he asks them to recover the practical confidence that flawed institutions can be repaired when opponents once again keep “two hands on the wheel.”