Grumet begins by challenging the common complaint that Washington lacks leadership. He argues that admired figures such as Ronald Reagan, Ted Kennedy, Everett Dirksen, and Tip O'Neill were not nonpartisan saints but confident partisans who could negotiate, shape public opinion, and accept compromise. The problem, in his view, is not only institutional dysfunction but whether elections and appointments still attract people willing and able to govern collaboratively.

Grumet then turns to elections, arguing that mistrust and low turnout shrink the voter pool and reward ideological candidates. He cites polling showing that many Americans doubt elections are fair and that many qualified people, especially young people, have little interest in running for office. To broaden participation while improving legitimacy, he proposes cleaner and more modern voter rolls, online registration, automatic or near-automatic registration, Election Day registration with government-issued ID, free voter IDs, early voting, and moving Election Day from Tuesday to Saturday.

The chapter next focuses on primary elections, which Grumet says often decide who serves in Congress but draw very low participation. Because primaries and caucuses are dominated by intense party activists, candidates are rewarded for rigidity and punished for pragmatism, as illustrated by examples such as Eric Cantor and Bob Bennett. Grumet recommends coordinating primary dates, eliminating caucuses and conventions, opening primaries to independent voters, experimenting with top-two systems, and separating election administration from partisan officials.

Grumet then examines the appointments process, arguing that presidential nominations have become a major deterrent to public service. Senate holds, long delays, ideological confirmation battles, and the 2013 nuclear option have turned confirmation into a partisan weapon, leaving important jobs vacant and discouraging qualified nominees. He calls for reducing the number of Senate-confirmed positions, streamlining paperwork, using independent reform mechanisms, and shifting the guiding question from how to keep bad people out to how to bring good people in.

The chapter also criticizes the vetting system and the Obama administration's restrictions on lobbyists. Grumet argues that excessive scrutiny over minor personal mistakes, sprawling questionnaires, and blanket lobbyist bans exclude people with useful expertise and push influence work underground. He defends transparent advocacy as sometimes necessary for policy progress, using the Bipartisan Policy Center and its advocacy arm as examples of how expertise and lobbying can help bridge mistrust.

Finally, Grumet returns to campaign fundraising as a major deterrent to elected service and a direct obstacle to governing. Members of Congress spend hours each day soliciting donations, which crowds out legislating, relationship-building, and policy deliberation. Grumet proposes eliminating leadership PACs and exploring a bipartisan mix of higher contribution limits, immediate disclosure, and small-donor matching, concluding that no single reform is enough but that America must restore the appeal of public service and widen the pool of people available to govern.