1 Don’t Bargain Over Positions

The chapter opens by noting that people commonly negotiate by taking positions and making concessions, exemplified by haggling in a secondhand store. The authors propose three criteria to judge any negotiation method: produce a wise agreement, be efficient, and preserve or improve relationships. They argue that while positions signal wants and anchor uncertainty, these functions can be served without positional bargaining.

First, they explain how arguing over positions leads to unwise agreements. As negotiators defend stances, identity and ego become tied to those positions, creating a need to save face. This makes adaptation harder and distracts from underlying interests, encouraging mechanical splits rather than solutions tailored to legitimate concerns.

The chapter illustrates this with the breakdown of U.S.–Soviet talks under President Kennedy over nuclear test-ban inspections. Both sides fixed on numerical positions—three versus ten inspections—without defining what an “inspection” entailed or designing procedures that balanced verification with minimal intrusion, showing how positional rigidity blocked an interest-based solution.

Second, the authors show positional bargaining is inefficient. Extreme openings, small concessions, and strategic deception prolong discovery of the possible deal zone. The process requires many slow, pressure-laden decisions, incentivizing foot-dragging, walkout threats, and stonewalling, all of which raise costs and risk impasse.

Third, they contend it endangers relationships. The process becomes a contest of wills—“my way or nothing”—which breeds anger as one party feels ignored. Businesses split, neighbors stop speaking, and bitterness lingers, demonstrating how positional tactics corrode ongoing ties.