Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In
by Roger Fisher, William L. Ury, and Bruce Patton
Contents
Questions About Dealing with People
Overview
This chapter addresses people-centric challenges: how to handle difficult counterparts, when to negotiate with extremists, and how to adapt across personalities and cultures. It advocates separating substantive and relationship/process issues, negotiating the relationship on its merits, and relying on BATNA analysis. It concludes that negotiation usually makes sense if it can outperform your BATNA, and urges cultural sensitivity without stereotyping.
Summary
The chapter begins by clarifying that “separate the people from the problem” does not mean ignoring people issues. It urges building a robust working relationship independent of concessions and disentangling substantive matters (terms, prices, dates) from relationship and process issues (trust, communication, emotion). Appeasement and coercing concessions via the relationship are warned against because they damage future dealings.
When people problems block progress, the authors advise negotiating the relationship itself: surface behaviors and impacts without blame, seek mutual understanding, use fair process norms, and frame discussions forward-looking. Throughout, maintain and leverage your BATNA, avoid mirroring bad behavior, and address apparent irrationality by probing perceptions and psychological interests to correct misperceptions.
On whether to negotiate with terrorists or someone like Hitler, the chapter argues the real question is how to negotiate unless a better BATNA exists. Negotiation is not capitulation; communication can reduce incentives for ransom and reveal legitimate interests. Examples include the Algeria-mediated U.S.–Iran resolution of the 1979–81 hostage crisis and the Kuwait Airways 422 hijacking, where persistent, bounded negotiation freed hostages without meeting core terrorist demands.
The text stresses that war is costly and uncertain; negotiate if it can better meet core interests than force, as seen in Cold War containment versus total war. Decisions to negotiate should follow clear BATNA analysis for both sides; misjudgments—like a bank ignoring a judge’s leverage or governments assuming a “military option”—can waste effort or worsen outcomes.
Finally, the chapter offers guidelines for differences in personality, gender, and culture: get in step with the counterpart’s pacing, formality, and norms; adapt general principles to context; respect customs without stereotyping; and continually question assumptions through active listening. Tailoring approach while holding to principled negotiation improves influence and agreement quality.
Who Appears
- Negotiator (general counterpart)Advised to separate substance from relationship, negotiate behaviors, and use BATNA to handle difficulties.
- Terrorists/HijackersTargets of bounded negotiation; communication used to free hostages without conceding core demands.
- Government and local authoritiesSet firm principles, negotiated logistics to secure hostage releases, and avoided incentivizing terrorism.
- Algerian mediatorsFacilitated U.S.–Iran talks leading to release of American hostages in 1981.
- Bank and bankrupt energy companyIllustrate BATNA misanalysis; bank should have negotiated with judge rather than stonewalling company.